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O V E R L I N E  
Social Media and the Elections 
Panagiotis T.  Metaxas and Eni Mustafaraj  
Manipulat ion of  socia l  media af fects 
percept ions of  candidates and com-
promises decis ion-making.
In the United States, social media sites, such 
as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube, are cur-
rently being used by two out of three people 
(1), and search engines are used daily (2). 
Monitoring what users share or search for in 
social media and the Web has led to greater 
insights into what people care about or pay 
attention to at any moment in time. Further-
more, it is also helping segments of the 
world population to be informed, to organ-
ize, and to react rapidly. However, social 
media and search results can be readily ma-
nipulated, which is something that has been 
underappreciated by the press and the gen-
eral public. 
In times of political elections, the 
stakes are high, and advocates may try 
to support their cause by active manip-
ulation of social media. For example, 
altering the number of followers can af-
fect a viewer’s conclusion about candi-
date popularity. Recently, it was noted 
that the number of followers for a pres-
idential candidate in the United States 
surged by over 110 thousand within 
one single day, and analysis showed 
that most of these followers are unlike-
ly to be real people (3). 
We can model propaganda efforts in 
graph-theoretic terms, as attempts to al-
ter our “trust network”: Each of us 
keeps a mental trust network that helps 
us decide what and what not to believe 
(4). The nodes in this weighted network 
are entities that we are already familiar 
with (people, institutions, and ideas), 
and the arcs are our perceived connec-
tions between these entities. The 
weights on the nodes are values of trust 
and distrust that we implicitly assign to 
every entity we know. A propagandist 
is trying to make us alter connections 
and values in our trust network, i.e., 
trying to influence our perception about 
the candidates for the coming elections, 
and thus “help us” decide on candidates 
of their choice. 
The Web, as seen by search engines 
(5), is similarly a weighted network 
that is used to rank search results. The 
hyperlinks are considered “votes of 
support”, and the weights are a com-
puted measurement of importance as-
signed to Web pages (the nodes in the 
graph). It is also the target of propa-
ganda attacks, known as “Web spam” 
(6). A Web spammer is trying to alter 
the weighted Web network by adding 
connections and values that support his 
or her cause, aimed at affecting the 
search engine's ranking decisions and 
thus the number of viewers who see the 
page and consider it important (4). 
“Google bomb” is a type of Web 
spam that is widely known and applica-
ble to all major search engines today. 
Exploiting the descriptive power of an-
chor text (the phrase directly associated 
with a hyperlink), Web spammers cre-
ate associations between anchor words 
or phrases and linked Web pages. These 
associations force a search engine to 
give high relevancy to results that 
would otherwise be unrelated, sending 
them to the “top ten” search results. A 
well-known Google bomb was the asso-
ciation of the phrase “miserable failure” 
with the Web page of President G. W. 
Bush initially and later with those of 
Michael Moore, Hillary Clinton, and 
Jimmy Carter (7). Another Google 
bomb associated candidate John Kerry 
with the word “waffles” in 2004. A 
cluster of Google bombs was used in an 
effort to influence the 2006 congres-
sional elections. Google has adjusted its 
ranking algorithm to defuse Google 
bombs on congressional candidates by 
restricting the selection of the top 
search results when querying their 
names (8). During the 2008 and 2010 
elections, it proved impossible to 
launch any successful Google bombs on 
politicians, and it is hoped that the 
trend will continue.  
During the 2010 Massachusetts Spe-
cial Election (MASEN) to fill the seat 
vacated by the death of Senator Ted 
Kennedy, we saw attempts to influence 
voters just before the elections, 
launched by out-of-state political 
groups (9). Propagandists exploited a 
loophole introduced by the feature of 
including real-time information from 
social networks in the “top ten” results 
of Web searches. They ensured that 
their message was often visible by re-
peatedly posting the same tweet. A 
third of all election-related tweets sent 
during the week before the 2010 
MASEN were tweet repeats (9). All 
search engines have since reacted by 
moving real-time results out of the or-
ganic results (results selected purely by 
information retrieval algorithms) and 
into a separate search category. 
“Twitter bombs,” however, are like-
ly to be launched within days of the 
elections. A Twitter bomb is the act of 
sending unsolicited replies to specific 
users via Twitter in order to get them to 
pay attention to one's cause. Typically, 
it is done effectively by means of 
“bots,” short-lived programs that can 
send a large quantity of tweets automat-
ically. Twitter is good at shutting most 
of them down because of their activity 
patterns and/or users' complaints. How-
ever, bombers have used fake “replies” 
to spam real users who are not aware of 
their existence. For example, in the 
2010 MASEN, political spammers cre-
ated nine fake accounts that were used 
to send about 1000 tweets before being 
blocked by Twitter for spamming (9). 
Their messages were carefully focused, 
however, targeting users who in the 
previous hours were discussing the 
elections. With the retweeting help of 
similarly minded users, >60,000 Twit-
ter accounts were reached within a day 
at essentially no cost. Twitter bombs, 
unfortunately, have become common 
practice. 
A more sophisticated effort to create 
a fake grassroots movement [often re-
ferred to as “astroturf” (10)] was the 
creation of a “Prefab tweet factory” 
(11). Designed to evade Twitter's spam 
detection, a spammer created daily sets 
of tweets targeting journalists and urg-
ing other similarly minded users to 
tweet. The effect of this spam was to 
give the impression to the targeted 
journalists that their reporting was 
monitored and was not appreciated by 
“the public,” and thus applied pressure 
to the reporters to modulate their views 
(11). We do expect to see such low-
budget prefab tweets in the next elec-
tions and whenever opportunity for put-
ting pressure on journalists arises (12). 
One of the effective (but expensive) 
ways to spam is to buy online search 
ads (appearing at the top of the search 
results as “sponsored” search in search 
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engines and as “promoted” tweets in 
Twitter) that appear in queries includ-
ing names and characteristics of the po-
litical opponent. When a citizen search-
es for a candidate's name or other 
related terms, the prominently placed 
and aptly worded ad will encourage 
them to click on it, thus transporting 
them to a page designed and maintained 
by the opponent. An example in a lim-
ited form occurred in the 2008 elec-
tions, when a site unfavorable to a can-
didate (TheRealBobRoggio.com), 
appeared as an advertisement when 
searching for the name of the candidate 
(13). The contents of these ads can be 
adjusted rapidly, allowing experimenta-
tion with titles and contents that will 
draw maximal attention. The selection 
of the best ad can be further refined to 
match the profile of the specific user 
with the use of data collected and 
mined by a process often described as 
“microtargetting” (14). A newer adver-
tising tool will be the use of “promoted 
trends” in Twitter (15) to attract the at-
tention of a wider, yet focused, audi-
ence. These techniques may be effec-
tive and legal but they are expensive, 
compared with the spamming tech-
niques we mentioned above.  
Yet more ways to spread spam may 
be through the use of photographs and 
videos that ridicule the opponent. 
Search engines usually allocate a prom-
inent place in their organic results for 
images and videos of well-known peo-
ple, including political candidates. 
Their selection in the search results de-
pends on the keywords associated with 
them (not with their visual contents) 
and with the popularity in clicks they 
achieve. Insulting-while-funny pictures 
typically attract the curiosity of the us-
ers and can go viral, allowing propa-
gandists to pass their message, while 
avoiding any automatic filtering by the 
search engines (16). Although this was 
observed during the 2010 elections 
(16), there is some evidence that search 
engines are working to clean their or-
ganic results, by asking users to report 
images they find offensive.  
Owing to their popularity and ease 
of access, social media data have been 
used to attempt to predict future events, 
such as movie box-office revenues (17, 
18), product sales (19), stock market 
fluctuations (20), and even electoral re-
sults. Predicting movie box-office rev-
enues using Twitter (4) and Yahoo 
search (5) data can be extremely accu-
rate if the predictions are based on un-
ambiguous parameters and a careful 
consideration of potential confounders. 
Predicting election results via Twitter 
data (which are readily accessible) has 
been applied to reality TV competitions 
(21) and a few political elections (22–
24). And it is easy to find Twitter polls 
promoted by newspapers for the current 
U.S. election (25). However, using so-
cial media for predicting political elec-
tions is highly controversial. There is 
no agreement among researchers yet on 
the measures responsible for any suc-
cessful prediction (e.g., tweet volume 
or tweet content). The time period of 
data collection has also been variable, 
ranging from weeks to months before 
the elections and ending days to weeks 
before the elections. In most cases, re-
searchers have filtered their data on the 
basis of decisions clearly made after the 
elections were over and the results were 
known (including which parties' tweets 
were included) (23). This has led to an 
inability to replicate reported success 
rates (23, 24). Representativeness is 
currently the most important problem 
(21). Just having a large number of 
tweets does not mean that there has 
been representative sampling of the 
voting population [e.g., in political 
conversations, 1% of the Twitter ac-
counts are often responsible for 30% of 
the tweet volume (11)]. 
Even more than in previous elec-
tions, we should expect that all candi-
dates and political parties will use so-
cial media sites to create enthusiasm in 
their troops, raise funds, and influence 
our perception of candidates (or our 
perception of their popularity). We 
should be aware of how that works and 
be prepared to search for the truth be-
hind the messages. 
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